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and the Individual Income Tax
ABSTRACT
We extend previous estimates of the average marginal tax rate from
the federal individual income tax to include social security "contributions."
The social security tax is a flat—rate levy on labor earnings (and income
from self—employment) up to a ceiling value of earnings. Our computations
consider first, the tax rates on employers, employees and the self
employed; second the amounts of income that accrue to persons with earnings
below the ceiling; and third, the effective deductibility of employer's
social security contributions from workers' taxable income. We find that
the net impact of social security on the average marginal tax rate is below
.02 until 1966, but than rises to .03 in 1968, .04 in 1973, .05 in 1974,
and .06 in 1979. Thus, since 1965, the overall average marginal tax rate
risesmore rapidly than that from the income tax alone. In 1980 this
overall rate is 36%. We note that,incomparison with the income tax, the
social securitylevygenerates 3—4times asmuch revenue per unit of con-
tribution tothe average marginal tax rate. The social security tax is
relatively ttefficientlt because first, it is a flat—rate tax (rather than a
graduated one) for earnings below the ceiling, and second, there is a zero
marginal tax rate at the top. However, the last feature has become less
important in recent years. The rapid increase in the ceiling on earnings
raised the fraction of total salaries and wages accruing to persons with
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(312) 962 —8923In our previous paper (Barro & Sahasakul, 1983) we provided estimates
of average marginal tax rates from the federal individual income tax for 1916—80.
Now we supplement these figures to include the social security tax on labor
earnings. With this addition, the included taxes comprise in 1980 72% of federal
and 47% of total government receipts. If some non—tax items are excluded, the
values are 75% and 52%, respectively.1
In the main the social security levy is a flat—rate tax, paid partly
by workers, partly by employers, and partly by self—employed persons. The
computation of average marginal tax rates is simpler than in the case of the
federal income tax, which has a graduated—rate structure and allows for
numerous deductions from taxable income. The main complications that arise
for the social—security tax are the following:
•
For workers and self—employed persons with earnings above aceiling
value, the marginal tax rate is nil.
• The tax applies only to labor earnings (and toearnings from self—
employment), rather than to total income.
•The employer and employee parts of the tax differ, because the
employer's payments are not counted as part of the employee's taxable income.
An individual's future social security benefits dependpositively on
that person's history of contributions. This element reduces the effectivetax rate
that an individual faces. In fact, Gordon (1982) argues that this consideration
1The dataare from U.S. Survy of Current Business, July 1983.If payments for unemployment insurance and workers'compensation are also treated as non—taxes,
then the percentages become 78% and 54%.—2—
is important for people who are close to retirement age. Generally, the
inclusion of this effect would require forecasts of benefit schedules, as
well as survival probabilities. It would also be necessary to include
various complexities of the social—security law, such as the declining
marginal effect of past covered earnings on benefits, the exclusion of
some years of earnings from the formula, and the treatment of spouses and
dependents. In any event, our subsequent calculations do not take account
of the effects of social—security contributions on future benefits. Thus,
by including only the tax aspects of these "contributions," we somewhat
overstate the effective marginal tax rates from the social security program.
Theoretical Considerations
Let s be the tax rate (marginal and average) paid by a firm on
workers' earnings. If profits are taxed at the rate r ,thenthe firm's
after—tax profits are
(1) It= (1—r)[F(L)—wL(l+sf)]
where L is the quantity of labor input, w is the real wage rate, and F(L)
is the production function. Maximization of profit implies
(2) F' =w(l+ Sf)
where F' is labor's marginal product.
The representative worker's total real income, Y,equalswL + I
where I is non—labor income. As in our previous paper, this income isspent—3—
on consumption, C ,orincome taxes, T •2 In addition, there is now the
social security tax, Se•WL ,whereSis the employee's (marginal and
average) contribution rate. Thus, we have
(3) YwL+I=C+T+S.wL
As before, income taxes T depend on taxable income, Y —D,whereD
is a broad concept of deductions. If utility depends positively on con-
sumption and negatively on work, then the first—ordei- condition for maxi-
mizing utility can be written as
-au/aL
au/ac= w(l—T —s)
where T' is the marginal income—tax rate.





Thus, equation (5) shows how the tax system creates a positive wedge
between labor's marginal product, F',andthe utility rate of substitu-
tion between consumption and leisure, —(atJ/3L)/(aU/3c)
Letr be the overall effective marginal tax rate on labor's marginal
product, F' .Thenwe have from equation (5)
2Forpresent purposes it is unnecessary for us to consider two categories
of consumption——depending onthe treatment by the tax law——as we did in the






.(s + 5e + T')
Thus, the tax system effectivelydeflates labor's marginal product F' by
the factor, 1 + s (see equation 2), and then applies the marginal tax
rate, Sf + S + T' .Ifthe social—security tax is not purely a flat—rate
levy (because of the ceiling on taxable earnings in the U.S. system), then
we can interpret Sf and Sin equation (6) as the marginal social—security
tax rates.
For self—employedpersons the formula is simpler. Namely, if sis
the marginal contribution rate to social security, then the effective marginal
4 tax rate Tis
S
(7) r =s+ V
Previously, we calculated weighted averages T' of the marginal income—
tax rates T' .Weweighted either by adjusted gross income (AGI) or by
3Note that T does notdepend solely on the sum, + s .That'sbecause,
unlike the worker's payments, the employer's payments are not part of the worker's
tax base.
4If themarginal tax rates I' are equal, then the equation of from
equation(7) to T in equation(6) requires sto be less than sç + Se ,aswas
true in the US. until 1984. For example, i T' =.3and Sf == .0665(the
1981 value) ,thenthe equalizing value for sis .106. The actual value of s
for 1981 was .093. The social—security law passed in 1983 and effective in 1984
sets the self—employed rate equal to the sum, s + 5e' but provides for some off-
setting income—tax credits.—5—
numbers of returns, and we computed arithmetic and geometric averages.
Here, we consider only the series that we focused on earlier, which is the
arithmetic average weighted by AGI.
Equations (6) and (7) tell us the necessary extensions to go from our








•s ; Sandsare now the social—security contribution rates for fe s
persons with earnings below the taxable ceiling6
is the ratio to aggregate AGI of thewage and salary income of
workers with earnings below the ceiling,
• is the corresponding ratio for self—employedpersons, and
• T" is the (weighted) average marginal tax rate for workers with
earnings below the ceiling.
Note that the measure r depends on
,whichis the ratio of appli-
cable salaries and wages to aggregate AGI rather thanaggregate labor incomes.
Thus, the index r tends to pick up effects of the social—securitytax, which
impinges on salaries and wages, on the generation ofaggregate real income
5Toget the last te, we approximate T'/(l+Sf)T'(l_sf) in equation(6
This approximation is satisfactory for our datasample.
6Note that thesocial—security levy is a flat—rate tax in this range.—6—
(as proxied by AGI).7 In order to study, for example, the choice of work
effort, a different weighting pattern would likely be appropriate. Then
the constructed T' ,whichwas weighted by shares of Ad, would also have
to be modified. Analogous remarks apply to the self—employment part of
equation (8).
Computations of Tax Rates
Table 1 shows the salaries and wages (column 1) and self—employment
income (column 3) that accrue in each year to persons with earnings below
the ceiling. (In column 4 the table shows the dollar value of the ceiling
for each year.) These data, combined with values of aggregate Ad, which
we used in our previous paper, allow us to calculate the weights and
which appear in equation (8). These weights are in columns 5 and 6 of
Table 1.
For subsequent purposes the important variable is ,theratio to
aggregate AGI of salaries and wages of persons below the ceiling. This ratio
can be divided into two parts——first, the ratio of salaries and wages of
persons below the ceiling to the aggregate of salaries and wages (column 2
of Table 1) and second, the ratio of aggregate salaries and wages to aggre-
gate AGI. The latter ratio is highly stable about its mean value of .84.
Hence, fluctuates mainly because of changes in the fraction of overall
7Conceptually, for a family, we would count either one earner's salary and
wages or two earners' salaries and wages, depending onwhether one or both had
earnings that were individually below the ceiling. But, for joint tax returns
where total salaries and wages exceed the ceiling, the data do not allow us to
tell whether there were multiple earners, one or both of which were separately
above or below the ceiling. However, we do know the aggregate of salaries and
wages and self—employment income that accrue to persons whose earnings arebelow
the ceiling. These data are sufficient for most of our purposes.—7—
salaries and wages that accrue to persons below the ceiling. This fraction
depends in turn on the ceiling on earnings for social security in relation
to the distribution of nominal earnings in theeconomy. For example, the
decrease in from .46 in 1937 to .24 in 1965 corresponds to a decline in
the ratio of salaries and wages for persons below theceiling to total salaries
and wages from .57 to .29. This behavior reflects therelatively slow increase
in the dollar ceiling on earnings, which increases from$3,000 in 1937 to only
$4,800 in 1965. However, the ceiling has risen morerapidly since 1965,
reaching $25,900 in 1980 (and $32,400 in 1982). Hence, the ratio ofsalaries
and wages for persons below the ceiling to total salariesand wages goes from
.29 in 1965 to .65 in 1980 (and .68 in 1982).Correspondingly, 21 increases





columns 2 and 3 of Table 2.
It is more complicated to calculate the finalterm of equation (8), which
depends on the average marginal tax rate T" for workerswith earnings below
the ceiling. From the I.R.S.'s Statistics ofIncome, Individual Tax Returns
for each year, we approximate the calculation of T"by using the marginal
tax rates and associated values of AGI for thefollowing filing units:
First, we take all returns from AGI classes for whichthe average of salaries
and wages per return is below theceiling value. (For example, for 1980
when the ceiling on earnings is$25,900, we go up to an AGI per return of
s =sand sfor each year are also shown in Table 1. f e s
only since the start of the social securityprogram in
can calculate the second term,
c1(Sf+S)/(l+Sf) ,andthe
on the right side of equation (8). The resultsappear in—8—
TABLE 1
SOCIAL SECURITY VARIABLES -












Ceiling 2 S =S f e
S
S
1937 26.5 57 3000.46 1.0 0
8 23.7 .55 3000.44 1.0
9 26.6 .58 3000.47 1.0 0
1940 29.4 .59 3000.48 1.0 0
1 36.3 .58 3000.48 1.0 0
2 42.2 .51 3000.44 1.0 0
3 44.6 .42 3000.38 1.0 0
4 42.9 .37 3000.33 1.0 0
1945 43.9 .37 3000.33 1.0 0
6 49.7 .44 3000.37 1.0 0
7 49.5 .40 3000.33 1.0 0
8 47.9 .35 3000.29 1.0 0
9 46.6 .35 3000.29 1.0 0
1950 45.7 .31 — 3000.25 — 1.5 0
1 65.1 .38 4.3 3600.32 .02 1.5 2.25
2 64.6 .35 4.3 3600.30 .02 1.5 2.25
3 63.2 .32 4.2 3600.27 .02 1.5 2.25
4 61.4 .31 4.3 3600.27 .02 2.0 3.0
1955 79.1 .37 8.3 4200.32 .03 2.0 3.0
6 81.2 .36 8.8 4200.30 .03 2.0 3.0
7 84.5 .35 8.2 4200.30 .03 2.25 3.375
8 82.9 .34 8.2 4200.29 .03 2.25 3.375
9 101.4 .39 9.2 4800.33 .03 2.5 3.75
1960 100.5 .37 9.0 4800.32 .03 3.0 4.5
1 98.5 .35 9.1 4800.30 .03 3.0 4.5
2 99.3 .33 8.5 4800.28 .02 3.125 4.7
3 99.6 .32 8.1 4800.27 .02 3.625 5.4
4 100.5 .30 7.7 4800.25 .02 3.625 5.4
1965 103.7 .29 7.2 4800.24 .02 3.625 5.4
6 166.4 .42 10.8 6600.35 .02 4.2 6.15
7 168.4 .39 10.1 6600.33 .02 4.4 6.4
8 214.6 .46 12.1 7800.39 .02 4.4 6.4
9 214.6 .42 11.9 7800.35 .02 4.8 6.9
1970 215.5 .39 11.2 7800•34 .02 4.8 6.9
1 209.9 .36 11.1 7800.31 .02 5.2 75
2 253.9 .40 13.5 9000.34 .02 5.2 7.5
3 326.9 .47 16.3 10800.39 .02 5.85 8.0
4 414.9 .54 19.8 13200.46 .02 5.85 7.9—9—
TABLEl—Continuecj---------
(1) (2) (3) (4)(5) (6) (7) (8)
1975 430.6 .53 21.1 14100.45 .02 5.85 7.9
6 477.0 .54 24.0 15300.45 .02 5.85 7.9
7 528.9 .54 26.0 16500.45 .02 5.85 7.9
8 591.1 .53 36.5 17700.45 .03 6.05 8.1
9 778.8 .63 47.1 22900.53 .03 6.13 .l
1980 878.8 .65 50.9 25900.54 .03 6.13
1 999.3 .67 57.2 29700.56 .03 6.65
8.1
9.3
2 1067.2 .68 59.2 32400 6.7 9.35
Column 1: Total salaries and wages of persons whose salaries and wages fall below
theceiling.
Column 2: Column 1/total salaries and wages. The denominator is from U.S.Dept. of
of Commerce, National Income and Product Accounts of the U.S.1929—1976,
and U.S. Survey of Current Business, July 1983.
Column 3: Total earnings from self—employment for those whoseearnings fall below the
ceiling.
Column 4: The ceiling on taxable salaries and wages or self—employmentearnings for
social security purposes.
Column 5: =Cot.(1)/total adjusted gross income
Column 6: =Col.(3)/total adjusted gross income
Column 7: Sf =s:social security tax rates on employers and employees
Column 8: s: social security tax rate on self—employedpersons
Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, SocialSecurity Administra-
tion, Social Security Bulletin, Annual Statistical Supplement, various
issues. Figures for columns (1) and (3) for 1978—82 wereprovided by
Anthony Pellechio.—10—
$30,000.) Then we include enough additional joint returns from AGI classes
where the average of salaries and wages per return is above the ceiling, so
as to exhaust the known total of salaries and wages that accrues to persons
with earnings below the ceiling. However, we carry out this calculation by
using the lowest possible AGI classes——that is, we assume that low numbers
for individuals? salaries and wages correspond to low numbers for AGI per
return. There is some approximation here, since some of the low values for
salaries and wages may come from either multi—earner families or families
with high non—labor income, which would have high marginal tax rates. But
some experimentation indicates that the potential error is quantitatively
unimportant. Column 4 of Table 2 shows the resulting calculation for the
final term, 1SfT",inequation (8) .Notethat this term——which reflects
the exclusion of firms' social security payments from workers' taxable income——
is always below .01 in magnitude.
Our previous estimates of the average marginal tax rate when weightedby
AGI, T' ,appearin column 1 of Table 2. We consider only the values since
1937, because the social security tax is nil for earlier years. The overall
modification to incorporate the social—security tax——the sum of columns 2, 3
and 4 in Table 2——appears in column 5 of the table (labeled SS). Then the
sum of columns 1 and 5 gives us the average marginal tax rate from the
federal individual income tax and the social security tax. These values are
in column 6 of the table. Figure 1 shows the average marginal tax rate from
the individual income tax T' (column 1 of Table 2), the overall effect from




(2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(Sf-f-s)
T
1(1+sf) 2s SS T
1937 .046 .009 0 —.000 .009 .055 8 .034 .009 0 —.000 .009 .043 9 .038 .009 0 .000 .009 .047
1940 .056 .010 0 —.000 .009 .065 1 .113 .010 0 —.000 .009 .123 2 .192 .009 0 —.001 .008 .200 3 .209 .007 0 —.001 .007 .216 4 .252 .007 0 —.001 .006 .258
1945 .257 .006 0 —.001 .006 .262 6 .226 .007 0 —.000 .007 .233 7 .226 .006 0 —.000 .006 .232 8 .180 .006 0 —.000 .006 .185 9 .175 .006 0 —.000 .005 .180
1950 .196 .008 0 —.000 .007 .202 1 .231 .010 .000 —.001 .009 .240 2 .251 .009 .000 —.001 .008 .259 3 .249 .008 .000 —.001 .008 .257 4 .222 .010 .001 —.001 .010 .231
1955 .228 .012 .001 —.001 .012 .240 6 .232 .012 .001 —.001 .012 .243 7 .233 .013 .001 —.001 .013 .246 8 .229 .013 .001 —.001 .013 .242 9 .236 .016 .001 —.001 .016 .252
1960 .234 .018 .001 —.002 .018 .253 1 .240 .017 .001 —.002 .017 .257 2 .244 .017 .001 —.002 .017 .260 3 .247 .019 .001 —.002 .018 .265 4 .221 .018 .001 —.001 .017 .238
1965 .212 .017 .001 —.001 .016 .229 6 .217 .028 .001 —.002 .028 .245 7 .223 .028 .001 —.002 .027 .250 8 .252 .032 .001 —.003 .031 .283 9 .261 .032 .001 —.003 .031 .292
1970 .243 .031 .001 —.003 .029 .272 1 .239 .031 .001 —.003 .029 .268 2 .242 .034 .001 —.003 .032 .274 3 .250 .044 .002 —.004 .041 .291 4 .257 .050 .002 —.004 .048 .305—12--
TABLE2——Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1975 .263 .050 .002 —.005 .047 .310
6 .273 .050 .002 —.005 .046
.328
7 .281 .050 .002 —.005 .047
.357
8 .310 .052
• .002 —.006 .047
.346
9 .289 .061 .003 —.007 .057
1980 .304 .062 .002 —.008 .057 .362
1 070 .003
Column 1: T is the average marginal income—tax rate, weighted by adjusted
gross income, from Barro and Sahasakul (1983, Table 2, column 1).
Columns 2—4: Calculated with data from Table 1.
Column 5: SS =column2 + column 3 + column 4
Column 6: T= column1 + column 5—13—
Consider the overall effects from the inclusion of social security,
as shown in column 5 of Table 2 and in Figure 1. The social security
termSSis in the neighborhood of 1% from 1937 until 1958, reaches 2% in
1960, 3% in 1966, 4% in 1973, 5% in 1974, and 6% in 1979. Thus, the inclu-
sion of this term produces a combined average marginal tax rater that
rises more steeply than the income—tax rate T'
,especiallysince 1965.
Instead of rising from 21% in 1965 to 30% in 1980, we find that theaverage
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The overail effect from social security on the average marginal tax
rate, SS, is always much less than the rate on employees below the ceiling,
(Sf+Se)/(l+Sf) .Primarilythis difference arises because ——theratio
of salaries and wages below the ceiling to aggregate AGI— is much less than
unity. As mentioned before, the variations inQ1 derive mainly from
changes in the ratio of salaries and wages below the ceiling to total salaries
and wages, which appears in column 2 of Table 1. (The ratio of totalsalaries
and wages to total AGI is relatively stable with amean value of .84.) In
other words, the key factor is the variations in salaries andwages that accrue
to persons above the ceiling, who face a zero marginal taxrate from social
security.
For example, in 1965 only 29% of total salaries andwages accrued to
persons below the ceiling. If there had been no ceiling (and unrealistically,
if the rate of tax,Sf =S ,wereunchanged), then the overall effect of
social security, SS, would have increased by a factor of 3.5from .016 to. .056.
On the other hand, the rapid increase of theceiling in recent years has
made this effect less important. In 1980, where the ratioof salaries and
wages to the total is .65, a removal of the ceiling (with contribution rates
held fixed) would have raised the effect from socialsecurity, SS, by a factor
of 1.5 from .057 to .086..
Table 4 compares the social security tax with the federalindividual income
tax for selected years. Notice that the ratio ofrevenues raised by social
security to that from the income tax (shown in column 5) risesfrom .07in1945
to .63 in 1975, but falls somewhat since then.
Column 6 of the table shows a crude measure of the relative"efficiencies"
of the two types of taxes. This measure is therevenue raised from social—16—
TABLE4




























1940 0.66 .009 .65 4.1
1945 1.26 .006 18.5 .257 .07 2.9
1950 2.62 .007 17.4 .196 .15 4.2
1955 5.95 .012 30.4 .228 .20 3.7
1960 12.0 .019 41.8 .233 .29 3.5
1965 17.7 .017 51.1 .211 .35 4.3
1970 38.9 .031 88.8 .241 .44 3.4
1975 75.& .049 120.8 .261 .63 3.3
1980 140.2 .061 250.9 .300 .56 2.7
1982 178.5. 296.7 .60
Note: Column 2 =SS(column5 of Table 2) +½1sfT" (column 4 of Table 2),
Column 4 =T'(column1 of Table 2) —1SfT"
Columns 1 anci 3 are from U.S. Commerce Dept., U.S. Survey of Current Business,
July 1983, and National Income & Product Accounts of the U.S. 1929—1976.—17—
security divided by the contributions of this levy to the overall average
marginal tax rate,8 expressed as a ratio to the corresponding figure for
the income tax. On this basis the social security tax looks strikingly
more efficient——specifically, in 1980 it generates almost 3 times as much
revenue per unit of average marginal tax rate as that for the income tax.
In 1965 the corresponding number was 4.3. The main reason for the decline
in thi number since 1965 is the sharp rise in the ceiling on earnings,
which has a positive effect on the average marginal tax rate from social
security, relative to the re1.enue generated.
The social security levy turns out to be relatively "efficient" because
it combines two features of a tax—rate schedule that have been stressed in
the literature on optimal taxation. First, it is flat—rate levy (on labor
earnings and income from self—employment) in the range where the tax rate is
positive. The shift to a flat—rate income tax has been proposed by, among
others, Friedman (1962, Chapter X) and Hall and Rabushka (1983). (Surprisingly,
these authors do not seem to mention that, in the social—security tax, we
already have a close approximation to the flat—rate income tax.) In compari-
son with a graduated—rate system, the flat—rate levy generates the same amount
of revenues at a lower average marginal tax rate.9 Second, as advocated on
theoretical grounds by Mirrlees (1971), the social—security tax has a zero
marginal rate at the top. However, as noted before, the rapid increase of the
ceiling in recent years has made this feature less important than it used to be.
is unclear how to allocate the cross—term,P1Sf•T" (column 4 of Table
2), between the two levies, although this term is quantitatively unimportant.
The figures shown in Table 4 allocate half of this term to eachtype of tax.
9A "simple"way to shift to a flat—rate tax on labor income would be the
following: (1) abolish all social security benefits, (2) abolish the federal
individual income tax, and (3) retain the social security tax but ata higher
rate (in the neighborhood of 10% for firms and employees, rather than the
present 7%).—18.-
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